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HUMANITY LAW:
A NEW INTERPRETIVE LENS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
Ruti Teitel*
INTRODUCTION
Globalization and the end of the cold war have set the scene for a
renewed debate on the meaning of law, rooted in and reminiscent of the
debate that occurred at the end of that century's previous great conflict,
World War 1I. At the same time, the growing density and extended reach of
international law have resulted in controversy and confusion concerning
international law's role in global order.
In particular, we see increasing overlap and interconnection between the
law of war and the law of peace, between international and other levels of
legal order, and between the regimes regulating public and private spheres.
Within the doctrinal structure of international law as such, there is an
apparent fusion between human rights and humanitarian law. These
tendencies have not eluded the attention of scholars: For example, Theodor
Meron has written of the humanization of international law and others have
noted the humanitarianization or militarization of international human
rights law. A third strand, post-cold war, is the revival of legal discourse
concerning the justice of war itself. Post-cold war politics fueled the
demand for a more sweeping universal rights regime. While humanitarian
norms originated in settings of interstate conflict, contemporary
developments challenge accepted understandings of war and peace,
international and internal conflict, and state and private actors, combatant
and civilian. With today's conspicuous pervasiveness of violent conflict in
many parts of the world, the law of war is expanding alongside the
parameters of contemporary transnational conflict. 1
The emerging legal order addresses not merely states and state interests
and perhaps not even primarily so. Persons and peoples are now at the
core, and a non-sovereignty-based normativity is manifesting itself, which
*Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School. Many thanks to
Robert Howse and Tony Sebok for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay and to the
Fordham Law Review for their organization of the Symposium and for their help in the
editing of this essay; my gratitude to Theresa Loken for research assistance and to Stan
Schwartz for word processing.
1. See Ruti Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law in a Global Politics, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 356 (2002).
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has an uneasy and uncertain relationship to the inherited discourse of
sovereign equality. I call this new normativity "humanity law" and it might
be viewed as the dynamic "unwritten constitution" of today's international
legal order-the lens through which many of the key controversies in
contemporary law and politics come into focus.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was a vigorous debate in
the world of Anglo-American jurisprudence about the relationship of law to
morality. It was the transition out of Nazism, in particular, that awakened
interest in this question. Leading legal philosophers, H.L.A. Hart and Lon
Fuller, argued over what counted as law. Should an immoral law be
recognized and enforced by judges as "law," leaving to politics the task of
aligning positive legal rules and moral truth? Or should an immoral law be
eschewed as in tension with the very idea of rule of law? Half a century
later, in the midst of a new flux in globalizing politics and economics, inter
alia, a version of the debate over law's relationship to morality has emerged
in the context of international law's changing role in contemporary politics.
On the one side-one might call them the "global legalists"-are those
who strongly argue that the best way to rationalize the changes beyond the
state and traditional sovereignty is through the law. Here, the lessons of
history are conceived in terms of their alternative mirror image, where
transformation is privileged over continuity. For global legalists, the
relevant legal norms are deterritorialized, autonomous from the state, and
therefore, are thought to abstractly give rise to the sovereignty of "global
legalism"-a higher positive law beyond the state. This account is often
entangled with a progressive teleological view of history. One speaks of
"cosmopolitan law" (Jiirgen Habermas) or a world government (David
Held) or a "world state" (Alexander Wendt).
For cosmopolitans, as with liberal constitutionalists, the individual, rather
than the state, is at the center-a position held to varying degrees by
Habermas, Held, and Mary Kaldor.2 The cosmopolitans' faith in universal
law assumes or depends on the truth of the normative substance of that law.
The putative universalism of human rights law is clearly one inspiration for
this faith, and underpins the many constitutional analogies used to articulate
the normative supremacy of the new international law. The drive to
normalize and generalize international criminal responsibility of individuals
reflects a faith in the possibility of international law to reflect and realize
foundational social morality.- At the same time, we witness elements of a
utopian vision of the law as insuring that politics is answerable to universal
morality. For example, Habermas has called for "the normative taming of
political power through law."' 3
2. For an exploration of the challenges of cosmopolitanism in the contemporary
moment, see KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS
(2007).
3. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 116 (Ciaran Cronin ed. & trans., Polity
Press 2006) (2004).
[Vol. 77
2008] HUMANITY LA W: ANEW INTERPRETIVE LENS 669
But is it a genuine universalism with which we are dealing? As the legal
skeptics (or realists) remind us, the cosmopolitan perspective is itself
situated in a particular context-today this context is Europe more often
than not. Indeed, a European, international law-based vision is often rightly
or wrongly juxtaposed with the image of American exceptionalism. 4 So it
is, that we can see the ways the humanity law debates lie at the core of the
current reconceptualization of the international sphere, contributing the
parameters for a new version of global bipolarity. Thus, as Habermas has
written in The Divided West, "the belief and adherence to law and
particularly transnational law is depicted as the province of the new Europe,
of the new sovereignty." '5 Others, such as Philippe Sands, have argued that
the stature and centrality of law is constitutive of a transatlantic divide. 6 By
the same token, in the United States, political analysts and scholars, such as
Joseph Nye and others, observe or characterize the centrality of law in
opposite terms (i.e., in terms of the reverse move underway in the last two
administrations away from law and what might be regarded as "soft
power"). 7 Nevertheless, what may be more important for us is that,
whether or not the United States employs the same vocabulary, these
pivotal debates serve to frame the tensions in U.S.-Europe relations, as well
as other characterizations of outlaw, or rogue, states.
Thus, to a significant degree, this legalized discourse shapes and defines
the parameters of the changing international realm as well as alliances in
international relations. Beyond these markers, there is yet a further
cosmopolitan claim: namely that the shifting balance and relationship
between law and politics is a step in the direction of perpetual peace, of
irreversible human progress. For cosmopolitans, the proliferation of the
law is somehow isomorphic, and representative of underlying political and
social realities-as well as a vindication of the truth of cosmopolitan law's
normative substance. Political progress is discerned from the mere actuality
of juridical developments-the expansion, thickening, and deepening of
law. However, this very connection in some sense depends upon the
presumption of a cosmopolitan ideal couched not merely in the language of
state self-interest, but rather, of heightened enlightened transnational
interests (in other words, a postnational normative politics). In this light,
the advent of what are, to date, largely judicially enforced norms is heralded
as a sign of universal citizenship in the offing; this is ironic, perhaps, since
the ascendancy of global judicial power has occurred in the absence of-
and arguably to fill the gap created by an absence of-political consensus.
This difficulty is finessed or obscured by the recourse to constitutional
language. Again, Habermas states, "Following two world wars, the
4. See Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 524 (1994).
5. See generally HABERMAS, supra note 3.
6. See PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: MAKING AND BREAKING GLOBAL RULES, at
xii (2005) (referring to the Bush administration's "full scale assault, a war on law").
7. Compare JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS (2004), with Suzanne Nossel, Smart Power, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 131.
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constitutionalization of international law has evolved along the lines.
prefigured by Kant toward cosmopolitan law and has assumed institutional
form in international constitutions, organizations and proceedings."8
For Habermas, and other European cosmopolitans, "cosmopolitan law" is
thought to be the great hope, offering governance at the level of the world
community as an alternative to supposed American unilateralism. For
cosmopolitans, the move to an ethico-human-rights-law discourse is
construed as somehow opposite and superior to the classic or traditional
language of state interest.9  Thus, Habermas characterizes "the new
dispute... over whether law remains an appropriate medium for realizing
the declared goals of achieving peace and international security and
promoting democracy and human rights throughout the world."' 0 Indeed,
for some, this is their main virtue-that in a global system, humanity law
offers standards of judging and delimiting the state from above. This
approach represents one side of the polarized debate over the potential of
the law.
Yet framing the relevant question at stake in terms of a debate about the
law-whether for or against-seems artificial or at least simplistic, as it
abstracts from much else that is going on in the world both politically and
legally. Admittedly, the debate has been enriched by an essential part of the
cosmopolitan claim, which depends on the law for its normative logic.
While the cosmopolitan perspective effectively captures the spirit behind
the proliferation of the law, because cosmopolitanism tends to essentialize
this spirit as a timeless moral truth, it ignores or is blind to the range of
historically contingent factors that explain the law's normative direction in
the present era. More problematic still is the cosmopolitan position's
dependence on the capacity of the law to function effectively as an
authoritative ordering of individual rights and duties. This is implied in the
cosmopolitan requirement of a universal ground of legitimacy, one that
does not depend on political agreement or compromise between diverse
multivariate political and moral claims. Here the cosmopolitan perspective
cannot but fail to do justice to the complexity of the current situation, which
throws up independent and conflicting individual-and group humanity-
rights claims, all interrelated with the state and statehood. The advent of
new processes and regimes allows not only for a greater multilateralism, but
also for one of a fundamentally different kind, made more complex by the
current expansion in the available representation of diverse state-and
nonstate-interests in international affairs. This is seen, for example, in the
conflict over the reconciliation of the protection of preservation rights of
persons and peoples put into conflict in the Balkans, as well as in tensions
over the human rights costs of humanitarian intervention.
8. See HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 115.
9. Id. at 116.
10. Id.
[Vol. 77
2008] HUMANITY LAW. A NEW INTERPRETIVE LENS 671
The most intransigent critics of the cosmopolitan view today are those
whom one might characterize as the "law skeptics," including realist
scholars of international relations. Such skeptics downplay the significance
of the changes that are highlighted by the cosmopolitans. They see the
post-cold war moment in terms of a reassessment and realignment of state
interests and interstate power relations.
For those who would see law in narrow, state-centric terms, the
developments in legalism discussed here have little or no material effect
because for them there would remain only one measure of the basis for
legality. It is one that is largely postulated in state-centric terms, namely, in
terms of the possibility of state compliance with rules to which states have
consented. The analogy is clearly to the positivist account of domestic law,
which gives primacy to the efficacy of command as a characteristic of legal
order; international law is meaningful to the extent to which it is a set of
effective commands to the states that are bound. 11
Notwithstanding the changes explored here, for realists, state power
remains the fundamental category for explaining behavior in the
international realm. The state continues to be the main actor in
international relations and, therefore, realists question the degree to which
there may be significant substantive transformation in the relation
international law bears to the state-citizen relationship (for example,
changes relating to the judicialization of the state) or any other citizen-
collective relationship.' 2 For much of the last decade, there has been a
position associated with the Bush administration closely aligned with
realism, or law skepticism, which is sometimes known as "neo-
sovereigntism." 13 This view of law is reductive and does not recognize
even the receptivity of the old common law to customary international
law-an arcane originalism simply not adequate to address the current
phenomena. In its American incarnation, it espouses a distinctive
republican view on what it is that gives law its legitimacy. Neo-
sovereigntists view popular sovereignty as the central or exclusive source of
legal legitimacy; translated to the international level this position is
unrelentingly state-centric, as it is only within states that republican popular
sovereignty can be exercised, and thus state consent to international legal
11. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 192
(2005). For a discussion of the drift toward compliance as a central preoccupation, see
generally Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International
Law Really Matters (Mar. 6, 2008) (draft article, New York University School of Law,
Institute for International Law and Justice, International Legal Theory Colloquium),
available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/2008Colloquium.Session7.Howse.pdf. See
generally INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss
ed., 1997).
12. See generally NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986).
13. For discussion of this phenomenon, see generally JEREMY RABKIN, THE CASE FOR
SOVEREIGNTY: WHY THE WORLD SHOULD WELCOME AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004); Peter
Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN
AFF., Nov./Dec. 2000, at 9.
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rules becomes the essential proxy or vehicle for the democratic
legitimization of international legal rules.
Oddly, considering that it comes close to denying any existence for
international law autonomous from the will of states, this point of view has
gained support not just among realist theorists of international politics, such
as Stephen Krasner, but also among a group of legal scholars, who use it
primarily to oppose the incorporation of international law into domestic
law, particularly through adjudication. 14 Therefore, what is at stake here
goes beyond ostensible U.S.-European differences, which often seem a
matter of transient perceptions of political power relations, or quarrels
between the intellectuals and ideologues, to a more pressing debate
regarding the current sources of legitimacy and the law, and the nature of
expectations regarding the normative aims of the law.
The positivist view of international law is challenged by problems
relating to changing political realities. There has been a "hollowing out" of
the state with ramifications for the interstate system, particularly for the
development and interaction of the public and private spheres.
Understanding the dramatic increase in weak states and the evident
pressures upon and the diminishment of state sovereignty in traditional
terms may help to explain the puzzling developments that provide our
context-that of greater international interconnection without greater
consensus-and accordingly shifts the project of politics in significant
measure to alternative adjudicative institutions and processes to provide
important independent dimensions of global rule of law. It is in this
particular context that such alternatives offer a legitimacy that permeates
and diffuses itself through interpretation of our complex realities.
In any event, neither of the polarized positions can account for what law
is actually doing here, especially in light of pronounced security threats,
posed by the rise of conflict. While the fitful course of human rights in the
late twentieth century is often explained in the extreme realist/idealist terms
above, this formal approach cannot adequately clarify the present direction
in international law and politics-a world of increasingly democratizing
and transitional states, which implies persistent disorder and pervasive
violence. Generally, the evaluation of foreign affairs tends to be driven by
political variables independent of law. 15  There are now neoliberal
institutionalist views (for example, those of Robert Keohane and Anne-
Marie Slaughter) that aim at a better integration. 16 Like the cosmopolitans,
14. See Robert Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic's
View, in DEMOCRACY'S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999); Jack
Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47.
15. See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L
SEC. 5, 7 (1994). For the extreme view, see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Inteniening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
16. On the relevance of method and interpretive approaches to international law, see
Stephen Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A
Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (1999). See also Tom J. Farer, Human Rights
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they can account for the instant trend toward legalism, where they have
observed the rise of processes and institutions reflecting greater legalization
of international policy making, 17 yet, for them, it remains difficult to
explain the direction of these developments. Other idealist views are
similarly inapt to grasp international law's transformed role in global
politics, as they tend to privilege formalist, but increasingly inadequate,
conceptions of international law.] 8
This essay aims to move beyond the prevailing perspectives on law,
whether from international relations or international law, because their
theoretical structures are of limited explanatory value today, as they do not
adequately comprehend present foreign policy making, which is itself
undergoing change in light of contemporary transformations regarding law
and politics. Mainstream approaches do not adequately register the
transformations wrought by what I have called humanity law-the evolving
merger of international human rights and humanitarian legal regimes, such
as the changes in personality, judicialization, and enforcement.
There remains the central and overarching question: What is the
principle of rule of law today? And, what is its relation to the present
politics associated with the globalizing project? The legal debates taken up
above seem to only indirectly address this question-namely, how
entangled ought the law be in politics?
At the very time that the law seems to be both procedurally and
substantively transnational, these critical questions often continue to be
addressed in national terms, giving rise to the notion that the different views
on global legalism today, somehow harking back to the spirit of the postwar
debates, map onto transatlantic differences.' 9 Yet this is too simple. All
that is clear is that the potential bases for the law--democracy, rule of law,
and human rights--do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. Nevertheless, in
the various legal debates about the meaning and status of "law," globalizing
law's purposes are often collapsed or the critical relation is often framed in
terms of artificial contradictions (that is, of due process versus democracy,
human rights, or justice). Yet even where democracy, peacemaking, and
human rights appear to go hand-in-hand, they are all ostensible purposes of
the present recombined international law scheme. Thus, the humanity law
in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1991); Judith Goldstein
et al., Introduction to Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 391 (2000)
(discussing realism). For a broader discussion of convergence of international relations and
legal internationalism, see David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy,
12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 9, 106 (1999).
17. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in LEGALIZATION AND
WORLD POLITICS 20-35 (Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane & Anne-Marie
Slaughter eds., 2001).
18. See generally CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN IDEALISM AND
REALISM (2003). For the history of this transformed role, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960
(2001).
19. HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 116 (referring to the United States as engaged in a
"moralization of politics").
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scheme can help us understand the ways the complexity of the subjects and
the values can result in tensions and, therefore, do not move in a linear
progressive direction.
The debate implicates the foundational question of what makes law, law.
At the same time, it engages the relationship between different legal norms
and regimes-international and domestic-and the question of international
law's role in domestic adjudication. In the American context, issues of
procedure, legal form, and legal substance are involved, as well as the
sources of the law and its legitimacy.
My claim is twofold. First, approaching a range of prominent debates
today about the law, which often seem unrelated, from a humanity law
perspective will reveal that they have common and entwined elements.
Moreover, rather than impose itself from above on these controversies,
humanity law inserts and diffuses itself as interpretative practice. It rules
from within, through interpretation, rather than from above.
So, for example, consider the many debates over the sources of
international law today, such as regarding the meaning of the "law of
nations." This term admits not just of one meaning, but instead, evolves
and therefore remains in part indeterminate and based on human practices
in time. Even with respect to treaty law, to what extent are the existing
rules of interpretation-such as those set out in the Vienna Convention-an
adequate basis for the interpretative activity of the proliferating adjudicative
fora? Moreover, given the apparently increasing number of such fora, to
what extent can normative pluralism and/or conflict be addressed via
interpretation? With the growth of international law, and particularly
concerning humanity rights, what is its relationship to domestic law in
constitutional cases involving human rights?
The legal debates are often waged as if what is at stake is the actual
"facticity" of law. Here, despite differing emphases or attitudes regarding
legalism, this is a moment of positivistic tilt on both sides of the debate and
the ocean. On the European side, one thinks of the philosopher Habermas's
excursions into legal theory in Between Facts and Norms,20 and more
recently, arguing for the regulation of the progressive constitutionalization
of international law. This is partly a conclusion based on his interpretation
of the density of the law-the byproduct of the increasing number of
agreements and processes. 21 Against this background, the dynamic and
pressing questions posed here by the pluralism of norms, and their sources,
somehow get translated into a concern about the potential conflict
between-and the hierarchical ordering of-those norms, and an inquiry
into which of these norms are authentically "law." 22 In the United States,
this has produced a stultifying debate, reflecting a form of retrenchment in
20. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1998).
21. See HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 116.
22. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 11, at 42-43 (arguing that "the behavioral
regularities associated with customary international law lack universality or robustness
posited by the traditional account"); Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 14, at 47.
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light of the many changes discussed here. Despite this reifying tendency in
the debate, it yields a set of wildly opposite claims, anchored more in
normative postures than facts on the ground. So, for some, international
law is seen as "expanding" and becoming ever more important; while
simultaneously for others, it is seen to be "fragmenting" 23-its domain and
influence more and more diffuse. Properly understood, the controversy
now underway transcends the essentializing antinomies that have tended to
dominate these debates--of law versus politics, realism versus
idealist/cosmopolitan, positivism versus natural law. 24
I. GETTING BEYOND THE REALIST/COSMOPOLITAN DEBATE
Examining the evolution of the international legal system from the
perspective of humanity law entails understanding change in terms of the
reinterpretation of an acquis. By offering an interpretative approach (one
which derives from the humanity law norms themselves), humanity law
opens a space for dealing with regimes sufficient to manage the
recombinant humanity law regime. 25 The humanity law norm is able to
recast many contemporary conflicts and, in particular, illuminate those
many conflicts today that do not fit the classic statist or realist paradigm of
power relations between sovereign "states."
Humanity law thus fills an important gap. Human rights treaties have
been subject to interpretation in a range of fora, including the European
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court, the U.N. Committee on
Civil and Political Rights, and other domestic, regional, and international
courts. For example, their discussion in the world court has been subject of
some scholarly writing. 26 Human rights law jurisprudence in the deepest
sense is still in its infancy. This is seen in that international law itself lacks
a theory of interpretation-a gap that, as discussed below, has been made
more vivid with the emergence of the humanity law regime. Existing
theory does not adequately account for the effect of international law on
international affairs in contemporary political circumstances.
Understanding these contemporary changes requires moving beyond
existing models, whether from international relations or law. Moreover, as
will be seen, the results are neither necessarily linear nor progressive.
23. Martti Koskenniemi, Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, at 682, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L. 682
(Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Koskenniemi U.N. Report].
24. This history has already been told. See generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 18.
25. On interpretation generally, see MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL
CRITICISM (1987). For discussion of the potential role of interpretation in the ongoing
conceptualization of justice, see GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION (MIT
Press 1993) (1992).
26. See Joseph Weiler, Prolegomena to a Meso-theory of Treaty Interpretation at the
Turn of the Century (Feb. 14, 2008) (draft article, New York University School of Law,
Institute for International Law and Justice, International Legal Theory Colloquium),
available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2008Colloquium.Session5.Weiler.pdf.
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In an era of globalization, international law's current mission and its
functioning need to be better understood, especially the effects of the
interaction of international law and politics in restructuring international
society under the guiding concept of the rule of law. The law and its
processes are increasingly moving from the periphery to the center so that it
is law, and humanity law in particular, that supplies the pivotal categories
for understanding the changing contours of an international society, and
indeed casts light on the relevance of the nature of the political regime for
the likelihood of its adherence to law.27
The realist/cosmopolitan positivism/constructivist debate bears a
resemblance to the postwar law/morals debate above. One position
embraces law, while the other reflects a morality-tinged political power. In
Habermas's words, "the new dispute . . . is over whether law remains an
appropriate medium for realizing the declared goals of achieving peace and
international security and promoting democracy and human rights
throughout the world."'28
Yet, evidently, this representation is also flawed as the new role of law in
global politics transcends any one particular debate and any one
geographical space.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE TURN
Let us reconsider the debates regarding the meaning of global legalism in
light of the paradigm shift above and the salient elements of the proposed
humanity law scheme. These can best be understood to enable an
interpretive space and normative direction that may help to defuse several
areas of conflict.29
Interpretation responds to the proliferation and fragmentation of legal
orders, which renders immediately elusive the search for an original
contextless "intended" meaning to the "law." Hence, one might say we are
already and always in the mode of interpretation. Judicial interpretation is
well suited to making sense of diverse normative sources, under conditions
of political conflict and moral disagreement. Courts are inherently in
dialogue with other courts and institutions that also play interpretive roles,
and their decisions in individual cases can give meaning to law without
purporting to give "closure" to normative controversy in politics and
morals.30
Thinking of humanity law in hermeneutic terms fits well with current
legal and political conditions. Given the complexity of globalization
(including legal globalization), the messy relationship of these forces to all
levels of governance, and the related proliferation and fragmentation of
27. See generally Robert 0. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457 (2000).
28. See HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 116.
29. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
30. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996);
CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).
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legal regimes that are decentralized (i.e., not ordered hierarchically), the
exercise of adjudication or dispute settlement simply cannot be framed in
terms of the application of a rule based on the divination of the common
will of the states that consented to that rule. Rather, the pursuit of norms
that are reinforced by transnational parameters is governed by interpretive
principles, as the norms are often downstream from any "original" national
origins. These norms aim to address a conflict between regimes that
demands "confirmatory principles." 31  Particularly since humanity law
involves transnational interests and norms, the relevant pursuit demands
interpretation, and pluralist perspectives may often be at issue.
Interpretation lends itself to this project. In the presence of different
cultures and traditions, humanity-law-based interpretation offers the
possibility of a ground of shared meaning. Humanity law, as an
interpretative lens, navigates the narrow strait between the Scylla of
difference and the Charybdis of the notion that these are known common
values. But, since practice arises in real cases of individual rights, this
ensures that this is not about an essential ideal, but rather concerns the
evolution of a norm to guide and manage conflict.
Moreover, the inquiry, as will be seen farther on, is delimited by
interpretation as praxis--especially the practice in adjudicative fora, where
the parameters of state-citizen, citizen-society, and citizen-citizen relations
are regularly contested. The subjects of the law are always linked up to the
normative legal regime, with the potential for tension, and the demand for
the reconciliation of a multiplicity of values elucidating what one might
conceive as a guiding principle of interpretation.
What is at stake is our perception of the meaning, force, and authority of
international law today and how to respond to the demand for a guiding
"rule of recognition"-a principle that sets, at the basis for the sources and
bases for law's authority and significance, some means of managing or
resolving normative conflict.32 This goes to the weight of the relevant and
diverse legal norms, the question of whether there is an institution or actor
possessing ultimate interpretive authority over the norms in question, and,
finally, what concerns or values might legitimately guide the decision
making that informs the global rule of law. Humanity law may well help
point the way.
III. FROM THE LAW OF NATIONS TO THE COVENANTS BETWEEN STATES-
AND BACK AGAIN
Humanity law entails a shift in focus from the state to the human.
Changes in the subject and aims of the law have implications for what
counts in the concepts of legality and rule of law as an international matter.
Ever since the last wave of constitutionalism, the classical tradition has
been state-centric and rights-based, therefore depending for its enforcement
31. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-77 (2003).
32. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 228-31 (1961).
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on functioning states. Moreover, the shift in what constitutes rule of law
normatively connects up to what counts as the legitimate and authoritative
sources of law. Changes in legal personality, subjectivization, and
judicialization go together here not only with related understandings of
responsibility and accountability, but also with related shifts in the sources
of lawmaking. With the addition of new personality and related regulation
as a result of the amalgamation of the three sources of humanity law
regimes, i.e., the complementing of international law with the law of
conflict and of human rights, there is added agency and responsibility under
multiple regimes. This, in turn, is making for a layered approach to rights
and duties in a globalizing sphere. Where persons and peoples have
humanity rights, there is an attendant opportunity to shape the law to which
they are subject and to shape the relevant values. Of course, insofar as there
is already a weakening of state-centric bases for legitimacy, this poses less
of a challenge to the current system. This is often seen wherever
individuals are helping to shape international law beyond strict expressions
of state consent.
IV. HUMANITY LAW AND THE MEANING OF "LAW"
Hart's classic essay on international law in The Concept of Law describes
the nature of international law and, in particular, what gives this law its
authority. 33 Hart readily concedes that international law lacks many of the
features that are thought to be characteristic of legal systems based on the
paradigm of domestic law: central government, courts with compulsory
jurisdiction, and effective sanctions imposed by a central authority.34
Nevertheless, for Hart, these observed differences, instead of putting in
question the character of international law as "law," lead to a rethinking of
the necessary conditions that have to be present in order to characterize a
normative order as "law." 35 Thus for Hart, "the proof that 'binding' rules in
any society exist is simply that they are thought of, spoken of, and function
as such" 36 by and for, those who voluntarily accept the far more strongly
coercive system of municipal law. The motives for supporting such a
system may be extremely diverse.
Further, in terms of its state of development in the prior century, 3 7
international law has been changing in directions that arguably bring it
closer in its forms and ways to the domestic-for example, in the
development of processes and institutions of judicialization and in the
centralization of sanctions, but, even more importantly, in the degree to
which international law has emergent potential for applicability and direct
effect upon individuals. This alters the relationship of domestic to
33. Id. at 208-31.
34. Id. at 208-09.
35. Id. at 212,222.
36. Id. at 226.
37. See H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
399, 405 (Achron Books 1966) (1933).
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international law and, moreover, may also redefine the actualization of law,
redirecting the channels for the law's normative effects away from
diplomacy or even the legal adviser's office in foreign ministries. In this
sense, the recent debates over compliance and the positivity of international
law seem to miss the point or reflect the anxiety over the nature of the
transformations addressed here.
Traditionally, with the very limited exception ofjus cogens, state consent
has been understood to be the preeminent source of legitimacy in
international law. The theory was that the sovereign could only be
constrained by its own will. Moreover, the object of international law-its
core values and interests in the interstate system-had been traditionally
seen in this light. Consider, for example, the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ): setting to one side the case of advisory
jurisdiction based on referral of questions by the U.N. General Assembly,
the ICJ's jurisdiction over a state depended upon the consent of the state in
question, whether in the form of a compromise or a compromissary clause
in a treaty.
Humanity law implies a different ordering of the sources of legitimacy.
One fundamental ground of legitimacy, derived from a human, not state-
centered, perspective is the expectation of a minimum threshold of decent
behavior, below which conduct becomes inhuman. This notion underpins,
explicitly or implicitly, many of the particular constraints on state conduct
(and not only state conduct) in humanitarian and human rights law.
Moreover, there is greater awareness as to changes in the meaning of
relevant practice informing current international law. The locus classicus
for the sources of international law, Article 38 of the ICJ statute, refers to
"international custom" as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.38
Thus there are two dimensions to the proof of the existence of a customary
rule: first, establishment of the "generality" of the practice and, second, of
its acceptance as "law"-opinio juris.39 Yet, contemporary approaches to
custom tend to privilege opinio juris over the generality of practice itself.
Indeed, some commentators, such as Meron, have observed that recognition
of opiniojuris may not depend entirely upon state actors. 40
Another area illustrative of humanity law's impact on the understanding
of sources of international law is that ofjus cogens. Jus cogens trumps any
conflicting treaty norms, as is codified in Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). As illustrative of the growing
complexity in conflicts involving states, persons, and peoples, consider the
38. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (June
26, 1945).
39. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 394-95, 405-07 (2005). See generally Koskenniemi
U.N. Report, supra note 23.
40. See Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
817, 817 (2005) (noting that the "modem approach to customary law, it is said, relies
principally on loosely defined opiniojuris").
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tensions between the norms involved in the landmark case of Prosecutor v.
Tadic in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), and the Nicaraguan precedent in the ICJ. The case involved the
question of how to gauge individual/state responsibility, where similar
issues arise, even if in utterly different contexts.41 Therefore, this gives rise
to a recognition of the need for a mapping of the transformed regime, the
relationship between change in the weight of normativity, and what counts
as the relevant sources and agents of law. Given the changes in normativity
informing current rule of law, it would be surprising if this might not also
lead to thinking about the sources and authority of law differently. This
will in turn help us understand more profound questions about the meaning
of legitimacy in current global politics.
There is also a legitimacy that derives instead from a conception of
universal normativity-the humanity norm itself.42 Other debates concern
the status and treatment of "customary international law" and its ongoing
force and authority, especially in relation to treaty law. As establishing
state consent (especially as evidenced through practice) has become less
central in controversies concerning customary law, the basis for legitimacy
has increasingly (whether implicitly or explicitly) shifted to some notion of
a shared humanity-based normativity, at least somewhat more expansive
than that which underpinsjus cogens. Such a view of legitimacy facilitates
the application of norms to situations that represent changes in the nature of
international order not contemplated when the norms were codified through
treaty law-for instance, the application of the Geneva Conventions to
terrorism and noninterstate conflicts.
The debates concerning the status and reality of international law have
been sharpest in the United States, where its peculiar system of separation
of powers and federalism, as well as its layered historical experiences of
both colonies and of empire, involving often contested projections of
extraterritorial law,43 have made it at once more sensitive to issues of
sovereignty and consent, but also keenly aware of the potential for legal
conflict and pluralism. As will be seen, there are other instances of
judicialization wrestling with the issues of the paradigm shift and the
reconstitution of the rule of law.
What makes international law, "law"? At some level, there is a historic
debate between positivists and natural law advocates. 44 The positions in the
debate go to the ways international law may well be distinguishable from
41. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment, 115-45 (July 15, 1999)
(proposing "overall control").
42. See Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio Dellavalle, Universalism and Particularism as
Paradigms of International Law (N.Y. Univ. Inst. for Int'l Law and Justice Working Papers,
Working Paper No. 2008/3, 2008) (discussing the various bases of universalism as a
paradigm of international law).
43. See generally Teemu Ruskola, Canton Is Not Boston: The Invention of American
Imperial Sovereignty, 57 AM. Q. 859 (2005).
44. E.g., HART, supra note 32, at 222 (distinguishing between international law and
morals).
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domestic law in terms of core rule of law values, such as generality,
applicability, and adherence. Yet, given the phenomena here, the debate
has taken off in recent years-both in and out of the academy-regarding
the proliferation of international law here and the related potential for
changes in its authority. The various approaches in the debate tend to be
remarkably polarized, with, at one extreme, the view that apparently rejects
the changes in personality and subjectivization of humanity law's impact on
international lawmaking. Here, as we have already seen, and as will be
elaborated further, there is considerable resistance to the postwar
phenomena incorporating individuals into international law both as objects
and subjects of the law, and ultimately and relatedly as lawmakers.
Medellin v. Texas raises the issue of who is the ultimate expositor on the
meaning of a treaty in the United States-the top political actors, or an
international tribunal (here, the World Court).45 The current situation is
characterized by overlapping authorities and apparent normative conflict.
Over recent years, several debates have surfaced regarding changes in
international law, overlapping with areas involving human rights in
constitutional law, as well as domestic and international humanitarian
law-reflecting the shift, as argued here, to a humanity-centered
understanding of rule of law.
V. TRANSNATIONAL GLOBAL LEGALISM: ILLUSTRATIONS
A decade or so ago, legal scholars Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley
began to question the aegis, pedigree, and relevance of international law.
This attack began with a challenge to the role of custom today-a source
termed customary international law (CIL), and a claim they say is generated
by human rights advocates, sympathetic pundits and academics, whose
point of view they label, rather oddly, the "modem position." The
challenge to international law, while first more particularly aimed at the role
of custom, was dramatically extended in a subsequent book, The Limits of
International Law.46 The crux of the argument is that the contemporary
developments that manifest themselves as legalization and judicialization
distort international law's traditional sources and, therefore, along the way,
result in a loss of its essential rationale and legitimacy. International law is
seen at its core as legitimate only when facilitating mutually self-interested
cooperation between states. Traditional rules are interpreted in this light,
and therefore appear as little more than crude default rules that would
usually be improved through bargaining between states to an agreement.
Where does custom go when convention also increases? State consent
undermines the notion of the force of custom grounded in and legitimated
45. See Curtis Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order,
2006 SuP. CT. REv. 59; Martin Flaherty et al., Medellin v. Dretke: Federalism and
International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667 (2005).
46. See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 11.
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not by democratic process per se but by state practice. Their approach at
once draws from present positivism, but also arcane originalism.
While acknowledging the changes in international law, in particular, in
its sources, 47 beginning with the postwar genesis of the human rights
revolution and picking up steam with the end of the cold war with the last
two decades of the twentieth century, these scholars portray the legal
developments in the understanding today of customary law as a perverse
distortion, largely attributable to a handful of academics making
international pronouncements-the "modem CIL of human rights. '48 Yet,
even as this account harks to the distant past, it manages to be utterly
reductive of the humanity law phenomena discussed so far. While
Goldsmith and Bradley concede and bemoan the changes, they also
simultaneously misstate the bases of these changes and their normative
implications.
On the opposite side of the debate are human rights scholars and
advocates for customary law-the objects of critique by the likes of
Goldsmith-who insist on continuing the longstanding tradition of the
common law's receptivity to custom.49 Thus, these apposite positions
appear, at some level, to be existentially important, as each independently
frames the relevant question at stake as a matter of core statement-each
position serves as an alternative stance on the bases for legitimacy in the
international realm today.
The heart of the problem is the continued adherence to the notion that
only state consent can be legitimating, even when it comes to legal
developments in the area of human rights. In the extreme state-centric
approach, the authority of international law-whether via customary
international law or treaty-continues to depend on agreement among
states. 50  The legitimizing impact is weaker where the state is
nondemocratic, or, where executive and expert elites hegemonize the
lawmaking processes on behalf of the "state." Still, state consent stands (if
often in an attenuated or distorted way) for the principle of democratic self-
determination. Whereas, the profound question raised by critical legal
study today is, "Why does customary international law persist, especially
given the rise of conventional law?" This essay argues that it persists
because there is a distinct legitimacy to this other form of lawmaking, as is
taken up below, which makes clear that what is at stake is a normative and
evolving matter of humanity rights, involving the claims of persons and
47. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 11l HARV. L. REv. 2260, 2264 (1998).
48. Id.; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 279 (2d Cir.
2007) ("[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations[,] and as evidence
of these to the works of jurists and commentators .... " (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004))).
49. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L. J. 2599 (1997).
50. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 11.
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peoples, made more and more on a universalizing basis, going to the heart
of its justificatory aims and logic.
Indeed, the tribunals (and the law they generate) are now wrestling with
the problem of the changing legitimacy of law, wherever it may depart from
sources other than state consent-such as custom, and, relatedly, the
"principles of law recognized by civilized nations. '5 1 This can be seen, in
particular, wherever courts have been called upon to apply the "law of
humanity." Such controversies have already been alluded to in prior parts
of this essay, especially regarding how to understand some of the changes
in international legality as they appear both procedurally, such as struggles
over personality or jurisdiction, or substantively, such as some areas
discussed here. These areas include: private actions for violations of the
law of nations; adjudications of international humanitarian law in a variety
of settings beyond traditional state consent; the global antiterror campaigns;
and instances of adjudication of individual rights in domestic constitutional
law that seek to draw upon and reconcile foreign and domestic norms,
particularly as concerns humanity-related rights.
Humanity law is neither utopian nor aspirational in content inasmuch as
it is grounded in common practices that imply at least a minimal common
normative ground.52  Ultimately, the appeal is to threshold norms of
preservation and decency, arguably inseparable from the idea of rule of law.
VI. AN EVOLVING LAW OF NATIONS?
Since the origins of international law, its contours have been defined
along the principles of the law of nations, the criminalization of offenses
which were considered to be plainly those of the concern of the
international community, and of justice. Even historically, the law of
nations normative meaning relates to offenses which do not map on fully to
states, though these, nevertheless, were considered of import in having an
impact in constructing international society. Indeed, as the founder of
international law, Hugo Grotius, put it, such violations-in and of
themselves-were those constituting and laying a basis for justice in that
they justified either punitive/legal or forceful intervention. Indeed, this
conception highlighted the evident nexus of the procedural and the
normative. More recently, one might say there has been a revival of the law
of nations. This has taken place in a number of areas-international
criminal justice as discussed above, but also in the line of litigation
51. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 38; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734
(referring to works of jurists and commentators "as evidence" of "the customs and usages of
civilized nations" (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))); see also
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 268-77 (discussing whether aiding and abetting international law
violations constitutes violation of law of nations).
52. See Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 193 (1815); Ruti
Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570 (2004)
(reviewing COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (Norman Dorsen et
al. eds., 2003)).
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involving the law of nations under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)-as
instances of the modem return to the principle holding tortfeasors
responsible for their adherence to the law of nations. Indeed, this cause of
action dates back to America's early origins, where jurisdiction was created
to allow suit by foreign diplomats involving the relation of foreign states
vis-A-vis individuals who were brought together by harm by the French.
This was a situation of potential miscarriage of justice that was conceived
as a necessary guarantee to prevent destabilizing interstate conflict from
harming individual persons.53
More than two decades ago, in the landmark case, Filartiga v. Pena
Irala, foreign nationals and Paraguayan citizens brought suit in U.S. federal
court against a fellow Paraguayan from their home country for the wrongful
death of their relative by torture in that country. 54 The case begins in the
absence of conventional law: since the plaintiffs' claim was not grounded
in a specific treaty, the question for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was whether, under ATCA, the torture alleged violated the
law of nations.
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. 55
The court chose a dynamic approach to interpreting the meaning of the law
of nations as deployed in the statute. The standard here was an evolving
one as "courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as
it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today." 56
Furthermore, to count as part of the law of nations, a particular rule must be
"a settled rule of international law" by "the general assent of civilized
nations." 57 After consulting various international law sources, the court
held that official torture is prohibited by the law of nations. As for purposes
of civil liability, "the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader
before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." 58
In the twentieth century the international community has come to
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic
human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture. In the modem
age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the
53. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 481-93 (1989) (distinguishing her concept of the
purposes of the ATCA from the "denial of justice" view of the original purpose); Thomas
Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLuM. L. REv. 830 (2006) (on
the historical basis for the statute).
54. Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 880 (emphasis added) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
56. Id. at 881.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 890.
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nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human
rights is in their individual and collective interest. Among the rights
universally proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be
free of physical torture. Our holding today, giving effect to a
jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but
important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people
from brutal violence. 59
From a humanity law perspective, one way to understand the law here is
to link up the substantive rights to their original protective values and
purpose. The aim is to avoid conflicts with foreign nationals that could
otherwise escalate into diplomatic tensions and even hostilities between
states. In its landmark Paquete Habana60 case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that "resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations"
as reflected in "the works of jurists and commentators" where the norm at
issue of respecting humanitarian values against the confiscation of fishing
vessels constituted "an established rule of international law, founded on
considerations of humanity." 61 The Filartiga court suggested that this area
reflects changes in other sources listed at Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, such as the bases for interpretation of the law
of nations as so held by jurists and publicists-that is, the potential experts'
or publicists' role in the pronouncements and recognition of what is
customary international law. 62
While this landmark case opened the door to the litigation of seemingly
private/international law claims in federal courts, almost twenty-five years
later, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,63 a case involving an alien claims
challenge, in the context of the tort alleged, the Supreme Court held that
arbitrary arrest and detention did not meet the test for Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) eligibility,64 but nevertheless, maintained that "the door is still ajar"
to such litigation, even though "subject to vigilant doorkeeping. ' '65 Even
among those opposed, this would be understood to recognize the viability
of judicial interpretations of the law of nations, 66 and, one might say,
relatedly, to invite other involvement by jurists and civil society in such
adjudicative lawmaking.
As with other sources or elements in humanity law discussed
previously-invocation of offenses against humanity as the basis for just
war, the "Martens Clause," the Geneva Convention, Common Article 3
59. Id.
60. 175 U.S. 677.
61. Id. at 700, 708.
62. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 47; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 666-67 (2000).
63. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
64. Id. at 763 (Breyer, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 729.
66. See generally Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SuP. CT. REv. 153.
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references to the "inhumane," or the criminalization of "crimes against
humanity"--the cause of action based on the law of nations reflects an
element of constancy that, in implying a universally applicable normativity,
risks being unbounded in the range of situations to which it applies. Here,
actual usages and practices serve an important delimiting function.
But these are merely illustrative-they do not create a set of frozen
categories that exclude the possibility of the law evolving and expanding.
What claims will be eligible for ATS litigation remains open-ended: the
Supreme Court referred to the congressional intention that the ATCA
"'remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or
may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.' ' 67
Accepting that open-endedness is a constant in this area of law, the
Supreme Court, while recognizing a cognizable cause of action, which it
said needs to be like the historical violations of the law of nations, remains
open to interpretation; for it also said the relevant claim "must be gauged
against the current state of international law." 68 Federal courts retain the
ability to "adapt[] the law of nations to private rights" by "recognizing any
further international norms as judicially enforceable today."69
While Filartiga required only that ATS claims be based on a settled rule
of international law "by the assent of civilized nations," in Sosa, the scope
of ATS claims was depicted in more complicated terms referring to three
spheres: first, what might be thought of as the prevailing interstate view-
"the general norms governing the behavior of national states with each
other"-and then beyond, to two spheres that one might see as reflecting
the growing humanity law, that is, the "conduct of individuals situated
outside domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international
savor."70  Also, the "rules binding individuals for the benefit of other
individuals overlap[] with the norms of state relationships." 71 Indeed, here,
the Court invoked the cause of action's historical roots: "It was this narrow
set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and, at
the same time threatening serious consequences in international affairs, that
was probably on minds of the men who drafted the [ATS] with its reference
to tort."'72 Offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and
individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy were, according
to the Court, "[u]ppermost in the legislative mind. ' 73 "Any claim based on
the present-day law of nations," the Supreme Court asserted, should "rest
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
67. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (quoting Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2000)); see also id. at 725 (articulating the standard for courts hearing "any claim based on
the present-day law of nations").
68. Id. at 733.
69. Id. at 728, 729.
70. Id. at 714-15.
71. Id. at 715.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 720.
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defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized. '74
Before Sosa, the ATS's reach had already been construed to include
summary execution, disappearance, genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 75 Post-Sosa cases
recognize crimes against humanity as actionable, as well as "cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment. ' 76 In Doe v. Saravia, a California district court
relied on sources of international criminal law, from Nuremberg to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) Rome Statute, to trace the prohibitory
norm of "crimes against humanity," declaring, "[t]he prohibition against
crimes against humanity constitutes ... a specific, universal and obligatory
norm."77 Similarly, in its 2005 affirmance in Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit allowed a cause of action
for crimes against humanity. 78 Indeed, support for the actionability of
crimes against humanity appears in Justice Stephen Breyer's concurrence in
Sosa, where he argues that crimes against humanity and other international
crimes could be litigated under the ATS on the basis of "universal
jurisdiction." 79 "Today international law will sometimes reflect not only
substantive agreement as to certain universally condenmed behavior but
also procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a
74. Id. at 725.
75. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995), reh 'g denied, 74
F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (genocide, war crimes, summary
execution, torture); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1475-76 (9th Cir. 1994) (summary execution, disappearance); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198
F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment); Estate of
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360-61 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aJfd, 402
F.3d 1148 (1 lth Cir. 2005) (crimes against humanity). In Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found bases for action under the ATS for
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, noting "[t]he United States has explicitly endorsed the approach of
the [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia] Statute and the convening of
the Tribunal." 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. In laying out the standard, the court invoked Judge
Harry T. Edward's concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778
(D.C. Cir. 1984), which looked to the Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations to
identify its claims, including but not limited to state-practiced, encouraged, or condoned
genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial
discrimination; and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.
76. See Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (torture, cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, and prolonged arbitrary detention for
twenty days, and command responsibility); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal.
2004) (extrajudicial killing and crimes against humanity for single act of assassinating
Archbishop Romero, and aiding and abetting liability); Cabello, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1345
(conspiracy and accomplice liability for crimes against humanity).
77. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-57.
78. Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1148.
79. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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subset of that behavior. That subset includes torture, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. '80
Therefore, whatever the current status of the law of nations, what appears
abundantly clear is the recognition of ongoing space for evolving
normativity in this peculiar area of the law where accountability lies at the
nexus of public and private rights. Still, courts diverge on issues such as
whether the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is
sufficiently specific to be actionable under the ATS.8l In Doe v. Qi, the
district court asserted that "'[i]t is not necessary for every aspect of what
might comprise a standard ... [to] be fully defined and universally agreed
before a given action meriting the label is clearly proscribed under
international law,"' 82 and that "conduct sufficiently egregious may be found
to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under the ATCA. ' '83
Accordingly, "the question under the ATCA is whether that conduct is
universally condemned as cruel, inhuman, or degrading." 84  The court
further noted that "[t]his approach is entirely consistent with Sosa."85 The
U.S. Congress has not only not stepped away from this reading of the law
but rather has extended its logic in the Torture Victim Protection Act,
affording democratic legitimization to the judiciary's approach. 86
This jurisprudence reflects the evolving normative space that the ATCA
inhabits, which can be seen as an established, structural feature of humanity
law. Moreover, it reflects the ways that agreement on procedures may be a
step toward consensus on substance. Or, rather, perhaps, as some scholars,
such as Habermas, have argued, 87 there is a reflexive relationship of
proceduralism to substantive normativity. This area defines, in an ongoing
way, elements of contemporary rule of law, as it creates a space redefining
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
82. Id. at 1321-22 (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass.
1995)).
83. Id. at 1322; see also Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1348 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (noting that "[g]enerally, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment includes acts which
inflict mental or physical suffering, anguish, humiliation, fear and debasement, which do not
rise to the level of 'torture' or do not have the same purposes as 'torture').
84. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
85. Id. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this
approach in 2005 in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (1 1th
Cir. 2005). The court interpreted Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain narrowly, holding that there is no
basis in law for recognizing an ATS claim for cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or
punishment. The court noted that previous courts upholding such claims had relied on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but that under Sosa, the Covenant did
not "create obligations enforceable in the federal courts." Id. In November 2006, certiorari
was denied. The approach of the district court in Doe v. Qi has nevertheless been followed
in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Bowett v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
86. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
87. See generally HABERMAS, supra note 20.
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the elements of the most egregious sources of conflict in global order and
directs where the remedy should be.88
Beyond the expansion of this cause of action, in terms of the normative
value at stake in the offenses, also lies the question of the responsible
subject. Put otherwise: Who is the self at the heart of the regime? To what
extent is responsibility conceived as limited to state actors or beyond? The
dynamic interplay of the procedural with the substantive is evident here,
where the revival of this cause of action not only illustrates the growing role
of persons and peoples in international humanitarian law as potential
subjects of the regime, but also, their role as lawmakers.
Traditionally, only nation-states (and certain intergovernmental
organizations) have been viewed as the subjects of international law.
Therefore, in Filartiga, the court's analysis under the law of nations was
aimed at the responsibility of states and its officials. 89 But, the notion of
this as a clear line has been challenged regularly in subsequent case law,
beginning with a case involving terrorism in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, where, in a suit for redress against the Palestine Liberation
Organization for a terrorist attack, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit-confronted with whether Filartiga applied to
nonstate actors-stopped short of extending liability. The concurring
opinion noted the growing support for individual responsibility under the
law of nations.90 Later, in Kadic v. Karadzic, a case arising out of the
Balkans atrocities, the Second Circuit held that certain forms of conduct
violate the law of nations, regardless of whether they are undertaken by
those operating under the auspices of a state. 91  Finally, in Sosa, the
Supreme Court appeared to tie the jurisdictional question at issue-of its
aegis over the private actor-to the evolution of the normativity, observing
that "whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action"
raises a "related consideration [of] whether international law extends the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor, such as a corporation or
individual. ' 92 To illustrate, more recently, in 2007, Khulumani v. Barclay
involved a suit against a class of corporate defendants for apartheid-related
claims, which dealt with indirect liability for egregious human rights
claims, in particular, the responsibility of the private sector. In this case, a
majority of the Second Circuit found jurisdiction over such claims when
connected to the most serious violations of humanity law rights, with Judge
Robert A. Katzmann in his concurrence looking to the precedents of a
variety of international criminal tribunals to bring these to bear on the U.S.
88. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("[R]esort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations.").
89. Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (1980).
90. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
91. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996).
92. Sosa v. Avarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 & n.20 (2004).
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court's decision. 93 Yet, a dilemma raised by such universal jurisdiction was
the extent to which taking jurisdiction in U.S. courts raised rule of law
implications for the foreign country's court. For example, to what extent is
there a message about the inadequacy of domestic rule of law as a matter of
the measure of the availability of rights/remedies, especially where human
rights related policy is at stake? 94 One might conceive this problem in
terms of the ramifications to the prevailing state-centric system for their
failure to expand the humanity rights regime.
Indeed, the question of interpretation became pivotal to the decision. The
personality and subjectivization changes characterized by humanity law
today, suggest that, so long as there is some nexus, the ATCA claims
clearly extend beyond state actors (i.e., Khulumani), reflecting humanity
law's broader structuring role in establishing expectations regarding areas
of controversy in current globalizing politics.
The broader point here is that these developments do not, and need not,
lead in one normative direction. Humanity law aspires to regulate the
interrelationship of persons, peoples, and states, recognizing that some of
the most serious rights violations transcend state borders or the interests of
any one state. Indeed, this returns to the origins of ATCA and the concern
to protect against destabilizing engagements, which bring together
individuals and states in risky connection. This nexus goes back to the very
origins of international law in the law of nations, in which the core concerns
are those offenses that, either because of their extreme gravity or because of
the peculiar nature of the attack upon the person (as in the "alien tort"),
have the propensity to transcend the individual to the collective. This could
be because of their horrific, inhuman means (e.g., torture on the body) or,
because of other related ways the persecution reaches the group dimensions,
such as those involving race, ethnicity, and religion, such that these attacks,
unless they are addressed, could produce large scale conflict that could
destabilize not just the implicated state, but the broader international
society.
Here one might recall the writings of the postwar theorists who, at the
time, also conceived of attacks on human collectivities, in-and not in spite
of-their particularity, as first and foremost attacks on humanity.
Protecting this idea was seen as critical to the legalism project. This goes
back to the beginning of the international idea.
93. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270-81 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring).
94. See Ginger Thompson, South Africa to Pay $3,900 to Each Family of Apartheid
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at A7 (referencing South African President Thabo
Mbeki's speech to Parliament, in which he criticized lawsuits filed in U.S. courts for
apartheid damages).
[Vol. 77
2008] HUMANITY LA W: ANEW INTERPRETIVE LENS 691
VII. OF STATE CONSENT AND HUMANITY RIGHTS: AN ATTEMPTED
RECONCILIATION
Humanity law has significant purchase on the problem of the
interpretation of treaties. Here, the doctrinal points of departure are the
prevailing canons of interpretation, as codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 31 has often been
interpreted, most notably in the jurisprudence of the World Trade
Organization, along the lines of "plain meaning" as used by domestic
courts, despite the fact that Article 31 emphasizes not only the "ordinary
meaning" of the words of the treaty text being interpreted, but also
emphasizes purpose, object, and context, with an expansive view of this last
concept. Moreover, Article 31 itself recognizes that there is a broader
normative universe in which the treaty operates; thus Article 31(3c) refers
to other relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties.
Thus, as Joseph Weiler has argued, Article 31.1 does not mean that we do
not try to find the ordinary meaning of words or their aims, but rather, more
subtly, that ordinary meaning is inseparable from these. 95 The ICJ opinions
in the Oil Platforms case recognize that the emergence of humanity law
may well necessitate moving beyond the "strict" framework of Article 31-
that this provision ought to be conceived as nonlimiting, given the
challenge of treaty interpretation in the contemporary context characterized
by multiple regimes. 96 Thus, at present, there is already recognition of a
vivid struggle in the courts over what the appropriate sources for the current
interpretation of conditions to deal with humanity law are, and the need for
interpretive guidance. In deciding the meaning and precedential value of
ICJ decisions adjudicating treaties where individual rights in domestic
courts are at stake, the Supreme Court has said that the first step is
interpretation. It proposes an "interpretive approach."'97 As the Court
observes, given that the parties making the law are states, this is not an
instance of self-execution. 98
Dimensions of this struggle are evident in the interpretation of humanity
law in the context of the "global war on terror." Here humanity law
becomes entangled in controversies concerning the separation of powers-
the relationship of the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches. These
debates are often perceived as rooted in American exceptionalism, insofar
as they involve the peculiarities of the American federal system. At the
same time there are general questions of legitimacy at stake that go to the
very recognition of legal norms, of legal authority, and the status of
international juridical norms as "law." Therefore, the approach this essay
proposes aims to reconceive these as part of a broader problem, as
95. See generally Henrik Horn & Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Communities-Trade
Description of Sardines: Textualism and Its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002
(Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2005).
96. See Koskenniemi U.N. Report, supra note 23, 451-60.
97. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361-63 (2008).
98. Id.
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characteristic of the current fragmentation and amalgamation of humanity
law, which often lies outside the context of strict domestic control, calling
for guidance in the interpretation of conflict. These conflicts arguably
transcend traditional interstate conflict, and therefore require reconciliation
with other areas of law, such as human rights law or constitutional law. As
will be seen, here, too, humanity law will be of interpretive guidance.
The legal responses to the "global war on terror" (i.e., in the counterterror
campaign), raised the issues concerning the interpretation of humanity law,
such as, those arising in the current work done by Geneva Conventions,
Common Article Three. Consider the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, in
which the Supreme Court sought to avoid the potential morass of textual or
source-based interpretation by simply assuming that the Geneva language
meant jurisdiction existed over the terror-related conflict, and, therefore, by
holding that Geneva Common Article Three applied. It made possible a
first line of protection of humanity rights.99 Indeed, the invocation of
humanity law here helped to illuminate a way to avoid an essentialized
view of the apparent conflict of regimes before the Court, regarding
whether the law of war was to apply, and, instead, to reconcile the regimes
via interpretation in keeping with humanity law values.
Another instance that is relevant to humanity law as an interpretive
device is the ICJ case law surrounding the application of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, in situations where a suspect who is a
foreign national faces charges for an offense that may carry the death
penalty. In the last decade, domestic and international courts have become
enmeshed in issues concerning life and death, situated between the
procedural and the normative; politics and doctrine; the international and
the domestic; the individual and the state. From the perspective of the state,
the cases appear to raise the question of what the ICJ's efforts are, but they
also raise the broader question of just how it is that international law
judgments regarding consular rights get enforced in U.S. courts.
To what extent might these treaty rights be self-executing at the level of
the individual? In a contemporary instance, Medellin raises the questions of
the redress for failure to read consular rights to a foreign national; the extent
to which such treaties are self-executing; whether these conventions gave
rise to duties and remedies that could be directly applied to individuals and
accord them rights; and, in the process, whether domestic courts properly
rely on foreign judgments, such as those of the ICJ.100 To what extent are
international court interpretations self-executing, and apt to surpass
domestic interpretation-whether judicial or executive? Here, the pressing
question at issue is often conceptualized as involving a matter of conflict of
laws, and the need to resolve this conflict through reconciling hierarchies of
power, whether judicial or political.10' Here we might distinguish between
99. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006).
100. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005).
101. See generally Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
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the U.S. Supreme Court and the ICJ in their way of thinking about the
relation of rights to remedies-judicial, political, etc.-as exemplified in
Medellin.
It is better to conceive the challenge as that of horizontal dialogue
between domestic and international courts and tribunals wherever
humanity-based normativity is at stake. 10 2 Indeed, one might say that this is
already to some extent embedded in the prevailing interstate system where,
for example, as contemplated by U.N. charter, Article 94-1, states have their
own law implementation duties. The International Law Commission's
Articles on State Responsibility are predicated on state responsibility being
engaged by actions and omissions regardless of the "branch" of
government, including the judicial organs.
In the cases under discussion, a majority of the Supreme Court asserts
that the reliance on other judicial interpretations is clearly required-
particularly, wherever humanity rights are at stake, i.e., the norms
concerning the right to life and related preservation rights for persons and
peoples. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has observed, the Supreme Court
has enforced those World Court judgments relating to individual rights. 103
Once again, this points to the way one might see that human-centered
normativity is entangled in the relevant jurisdictional questions.
Nevertheless, this case was ultimately closely decided against the notion of
automatic self-execution under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Article 36(1), despite the ICJ's contrary holding, a conclusion
which goes to the sense of the status of humanity rights as emergent, but not
yet consolidated. In the most recent iteration in Medellin v. Texas, the U.S.
Supreme Court distinguished between treaties involving directly applicable
individual rights by seeking to delineate those norms that are amenable to
judicial remedies associated with the prevailing interstate system.
As the number of obligations is growing, it is in the area where
international law generates more than one duty that interpretation is likely
to be in greater demand and play a most important role. 10 4 Indeed, at the
heart of the decision in Medellin is the question of what law applied to the
case-often blurring procedural/jurisdictional questions with the
substantive merits.
The problem of the nature of the evolving connections between the
individual and the state both legally and morally is taking on more and
more resonance. This is clear from a number of landmark opinions by the
international judiciary in the Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
102. See Teitel, supra note 52, at 2584-87 (discussing the role of comparativism and
dialogue).
103. See Medellin, 544 U.S. at 670 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stephen Breyer
observed that there is weight to the ICJ judgment. Id. at 693-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. See Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Commitment and
Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1,201.
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(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro),10 5 Tadic, and Nicaragua
on the question of what standard of individual responsibility pertains to the
enforcement of humanity rights. Not only does state responsibility not
shrink as individual responsibility expands, but the reverse occurs. In the
first instance, it is states that are responsible even for the behavior of private
actors under international treaties, illustrating the ways humanity law leads
to a pervasive global rule of law.
The ICJ, in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In
and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), deployed
a strict standard, invoking an "effective control" test in assessing the
existence of responsibility.' 0 6 In the same vein, the more recent Tadic case,
involving prosecution in the ICTY, deployed a lower standard of nexus for
making out responsibility, looking to "de facto control,"'1 7 clearly
reflecting the ways the guiding interpretive principle draws inevitably from
the relevant subject of the interpretive enterprise. Tadic involves the
prosecution of violations of humanity-related rights and therefore guides the
interpretation of the understanding of individual responsibility in the service
of greater protection of the normative humanity rights.' 08
Now consider Bosnia v. Serbia, involving a suit in the World Court
conceived by states but involving human rights, raising the question again
of what standard of responsibility should apply-this time in a context
arguably where we have come full circle from the traditional interstate
situation-where what is at stake is a case of inferring from individual
responsibility, in order to reconceptualize state or collective
responsibility. 109 Now, post-Nicaragua and post-Tadic-with the advent of
tribunalization and its individuation of responsibility in the international
realm-the question that emerges has become "Against whom do human
rights obligations run?" In a recent series of cases, the ICJ sought to elide
these precedents, reverting to the prior norm and suggesting that there was
no clear hierarchy in terms of substantive doctrinal development.
What cases such as Medellin make very clear is that, unlike many of the
other prevailing treaties, the consular obligations, like the Genocide
Convention and like much of international humanitarian law discussed here,
do not just raise a matter of obligations between state parties. Rather, they
also imply duties owed to humans, therefore, positing a teleological value
that may well inform the direction of the doctrine. Indeed, in this regard
105. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 396-407 (Feb. 26)
(application of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide) [hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia].
106. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 64-65, 115 (June 27).
107. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 115-45 (July 15, 1999).
108. R (on the application of AI-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence,
[2007] UKHL 26, 129 (Lord Brown) ("[E]xcept where a state really does have effective
control of territory, it cannot hope to secure Convention rights within that territory ... .
109. Bosnia v. Serbia, supra note 105, 396-413.
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one might analogize to the extradition of the Chilean dictator, Augusto
Pinochet, raising conflict between the adherence to traditional state-centric
immunities, and the challenge of countervailing claims of human rights.
This analogy may offer another example in which judicial powers-local,
regional, and international-may well differ regarding the appropriate
standard of individual responsibility, but, where, ultimately, the normativity
transcends and goes to the humanity law subject and values. This, in turn,
serves to reopen debate about state responsibility with global effects, at
least in terms of discursive impact, as it opens a dialogue as to what would
constitute rule of law in the contemporary context.
VIII. "INTERNATIONAL" LAW IN "DOMESTIC" COURTS: JUDICIAL
RECOGNITION OF EMERGENT GLOBAL HUMANITY RIGHTS
A final illustration involves a vivid debate over international and foreign
law in domestic courts that squarely reflects some of the dilemmas posed by
the globalization of humanity law and its broader normative impact. Once
again, these bring together the domestic and the international judiciary, the
individual and the state, and procedural, jurisdictional, substantive, and
normative rights. Particularly, where the controversy in question raises
humanity rights issues, there now is an evolving interpretative debate
regarding the force and authority of foreign law in domestic constitutional
law. This last area involves the question of what guides interpretations of
international humanity rights where they interface with constitutional law.
From a humanity law perspective, the debates involve areas where there
has been a distinct change, as a result of the expansion in and proliferation
of international humanitarian law in the overlapping and recombination of
regimes in the law, which at a minimum spur reinterpretation. These are
judicialized controversies, and they all deal with rights of humanity. In
particular, the controversies at issue concern claims made based on widely
shared practices regarding the rights to life of humankind, as set out in a
variety of human rights conventions, as well as enforced in international
humanitarian law charters. As previously discussed, these are rights of a
basic sort, such as to decent treatment and to the preservation of persons
and peoples. Ultimately, the prism of humanity law can help us understand
these debates as related to the ongoing evolution of the law insofar as they
involve the dynamic relationship of the local and the international systems,
particularly relating to the protection of basic rights and the sites of related
duties regarding what one might term global humanity rights. Here, the
judicial enterprise-particularly its comparativist dimensions-gains a
significant new foundation if we assume the common ground of "humanity
law" and a horizontal interpretative dialogue between domestic and
international tribunals-in a world of multiple regimes, where there isn't
centralization or monopoly or hierarchy of interpretative authority, and
where interpretative legitimacy pertains to nonstate actors as well.
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IX. HUMANITY LAW AND INTERPRETING DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONS
Around the world, courts are engaging more often with foreign sources in
their constitutional jurisprudence. A consensus appears to be forming
regarding the relevance of foreign sources, at least within circumscribed
parameters. Legal debates are currently considering this development.
Generally, the justification for comparativist analysis is couched largely in
functionalist terms (i.e., as a basis for the resolution of specific domestic
constitutional issues), particularly, in areas of unsettled law. This is as true
of Europe and the United States, as of the Middle East. 110 But, from the
humanity law perspective, one can see it is a development that is broader,
reflecting other dimensions of global legalism and the related dimensions in
the paradigm shift.
Jeremy Waldron has employed the term jus gentium111 to articulate his
notion of a "universal law administered in all civilized countries" that has
always been used to solve problems. 112 There was always an overlap
historically between the law of nations in this specific sense and
international law, just as there was always an overlap between domestic law
and international law. In fact, there was always a basis for importing
foreign law in the domestic context1 13 (uses which predate the modem state
but continue to pertain today), to what extent does jus gentium graft back to
older tradition in international law? Beyond the common law, historically,
the idea of "higher" law was always informed by international and foreign
sources. 114 Indeed, the notion of universal rights, as a matter of higher law,
underlies the theory of international law. Thus, here we might consider the
link between comparative constitutional law and the sources of international
law. Indeed, one might see comparative constitutionalism as interrogating
foreign mores with a view to tracing the contours of a universal legal
normativity.
Historically, jus gentium-like cases raised questions where there exist
common norms of humanity.' 15 Indeed, the argument that a jus gentium
has emerged can be seen as extending the historical notion of the law that
protected aliens-which followed them as they traveled-to the extent that
this law was undergirded by justice, not just concepts of reciprocity. 116 In
today's globalized world there are the many problems relating to persons
and peoples on the move-whether issues involving rights of aliens, the rise
110. For the critique of the functionalist view of the role of comparativism, see generally
Gunther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411, 434-40 (1985).
111. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119
HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005).
112. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
113. See generally Waldron, supra note 111.
114. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 38 (providing that
international custom offers evidence of a general practice accepted as law); K. ZWEIGERT &
H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Oxford Univ. Press Inc. 1998) (1977).
115. See Teitel, supra note 52, at 2592-95.
116. See id.
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of migration of minorities, or of peoples. That is, if one of the oldest
meanings of jus gentium is as a common law to regulate dealings with
aliens, with globalization, one might suppose that this concern gains a
renewed significance today. Here, we can see that in the current global
order something has changed relating to the greater movement and
interaction of persons and peoples across state boundaries.
The potential role for comparative constitutional law in what one might
say is the constitutionalization of international law and vice versa has
recently taken on new urgency. But from a humanity law perspective, one
can see that the aims do not reasonably relate to any grand constitutional
scheme. 117 While this is clearly reflected in U.S. case law, its usages reflect
a drawing upon material from a common fund of normative practice, with a
commonality depending on the assumed, if often not fully spelled out,
humanity law foundations.
The value of comparative constitutionalism is captured by Justice Breyer:
"[Foreign authority] may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem. .... 118
One might say this rationale largely points backward, in that it underscores
statism and originalism, if not outright exceptionalism.
By contrast, in a growing number of cases where human rights are at
stake, the comparative practice is justified not as backward looking to
rationalize the source of the state's interests (i.e., as a way to legitimate the
interpretation), but instead on humanity-centric terms. For example, now-
retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asserted that "[o]ther legal systems
continue to innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new
legal problems that arise each day, from which we can learn and benefit."' 119
What is "foreign" authority actually doing here? Upon a closer look, the
broader issue of the relevance of "foreign" authority plays a role analogous
to the role of humanity rights. Constitutional interpretation is best
rationalized in terms of practices in conditions analogous to those of
constitutional change, primarily involving discrete areas of unsettled law. It
informs the interpretation of norms for the resolution of conflict. However,
that is just the point. One might say that the bases for comparativism's
revival today go further than the functionalist enterprise because what is at
stake is not merely problem solving at present, but rather the uses of
humanity law-in and of themselves-help to define our sense of the
relevant issues that are perceived as in "common." Humanity law generates
and transforms the meaning of the enterprise, redefining the weight and
relevance of the law of the human community, so helping to shape an
alternative rule of law.
117. Cf HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 32.
118. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997).
119. Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT'L JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2.
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X. COMPARATIVISM IN HUMANITY LAW: INFORMING GLOBAL
RULE OF LAW
In a number of areas, there are apparent overlapping and recombinant
legal regimes, with an impact on both international and domestic law,
particularly domestic constitutional law, a movement whose bona fides
occur primarily in the area defined here in terms of the "law of humanity."
For the first half of the twentieth century, in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, the relevant nexus of language was the basis of a community,
notably of "English-speaking nations." 120 Yet, this principle was ultimately
abandoned as it lacked workable parameters. 121
In the modem cases, the relevant constitutional parameters regarding
foreign authorities are often derived from the "common law" or "Anglo-
American heritage." 122 However, in the lower courts, one might see the
following of Anglo-American jurisprudence as simple adherence to a
system of binding authority. In the Supreme Court, such common law
norms reflect a broader concern about remaining within the legal tradition.
These norms perhaps draw from historical inquiry into preconstitutional
traditions, 123 or, perhaps are grounded in common political cultures that are
"democracy-based" or of a "civilized nature," such as in the current reliance
on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 124 harking
back to historical understandings of unified law on the continent. In
Lawrence v. Texas, 125 the Supreme Court invoked the European Court of
120. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the regulation at issue "involves what, by common understanding throughout the
English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty');
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (referring to "the history and the basic
constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples"); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 413-14 (1945) (interpreting due process in light of "the history of freedom of English-
speaking peoples"); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (referring to constitutions as
"generally understood by all English-speaking communities").
121. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952) (Black, J., concurring)
(questioning a limit to "English-speaking" peoples).
122. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-97 (1990) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion) (relying on "nations
that share our Anglo-American heritage"); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947)
(regarding "Anglo-American legal tradition" as the basis for the relevant connection).
123. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952-53 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "the
historical traditions of the American people" began with "[t]he common law which we
inherited from England"); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (justifying the
American law as in "accordance with the standards of this common-law tradition"); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968) (questioning "whether... a procedure is
necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
99-100 (1958) (noting that the constitutional idea of "due process" began with the English
Declaration of Rights of 1688 and the Magna Carta).
124. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 576 (2003) (citing decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights); see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 (considering the
views of "leading members of the Western European community").
125. 539 U.S. 558.
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Human Rights rulings and "Western tradition" to discredit a domestic
ruling limiting privacy and humanity rights.
Here, we are dealing with something less narrow thanjus cogens but with
a stronger, or more emphatic, normative pull than the notion of "general
principles of law of civilized nations"-a threshold rights-centered
international legal normativity, reflecting a strong enough sense of
universal practice to justify general application (or at least a strong
interpretative presumption that this core is consistent with and must be
respected in any reading or application of particular treaties and particular
domestic legal rules, even, and perhaps especially, constitutional ones).
Substantial common ground on this plane exists among national
constitutions, and conformity with international conventions demonstrates a
consensus on basic human rights, as well as on the protection of decency 26
and integrity. 127  From these data points, one might infer a bounded
universal "law of humanity," the logical peak of the comparativist project.
Yet this bounded universalism is limited by the nature of humanity law
itself. "Humanity rights" are pivotal in the present globalizing regime,
which is again distinguished not by integration, but by interdependence, and
therefore spurs a related demand for shared rights wherever
interdependence is on the ascent. One might say comparative constitutional
law's current extension offers an alternative conception of legitimacy,
grounded in core human rights and needed to reinforce a nascent global
order.
Comparative constitutionalism is now extending its quest for conformity
into the sphere of due process, where the phenomenon has been most
evident in developments within criminal procedure. Yet, the normative
desirability of such integration, much less convergence, may well be
debatable, 128 given the extant differences in legal cultures and political
traditions, 129 hence, the connection between procedure and normativity.
126. See, e.g., Knight, 528 U.S. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the Privy Council
regarding the "inhumanity" of death penalty delays).
127. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (describing Fourteenth Amendment "due process"
rights understanding); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-17 (2002) (analyzing Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785-87 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring) (referring to the law of the Netherlands when discussing the right to
assisted suicide); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 (plurality opinion) (holding that the execution
of juveniles violates norms of the Western European community); see also United States v.
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting the relevance of Nuremberg Trials procedures regarding consent standards for
medical experimentalism); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion) (inquiring into
"evolving standards of decency").
128. On convergence in criminal law, compare GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF
CRIMINAL LAW (1998) (arguing for convergence), with JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003)
(discussing divergence among American, German, and French criminal justice policies). On
the risks of comparativism's misinterpreting similarities, see William P. Alford, On the
Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945, 955 (1986).
129. See Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-
American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 844-47, 851 (1997)
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Comparativism's normative role in constitutional interpretation is most
evident in current American constitutional jurisprudence in the context
involving life and death, where the Court has been willing to turn outward
to invoke an understanding of evolving human decency in a global order.
Interpreting the Eighth Amendment protection from "cruel and unusual
punishment," through case law from Thompson v. Oklahoma130 through
Stanford v. Kentucky, 131 and Atkins v. Virginia,132 there is an increasing
reliance on foreign sources of law. In Stanford, Justice William Brennan, in
dissent, relied on comparative materials to support the view that
"contemporary standards of decency" would preclude the execution of
juveniles. 133 Over a vigorous dissent challenging foreign law's relevance, a
plurality in Thompson relied on such experience to inform the meaning of
"civilized standards of decency" 134 to the "fundamental beliefs of this
[n]ation."' 135 In Atkins, a majority found that "the world community"
"overwhelmingly disapproved" of execution of the mentally retarded.' 36 In
the latest Supreme Court death penalty case (in which the issue was
invoking the death penalty for rape), the Court pointed to an attempted
equivalence approach-acceptance of death only when life or death
humanity rights are at stake. 137 In Lawrence, the criminalization of sodomy
was said to violate a due process "liberty" in reliance upon European
authority and "values we share with a wider civilization."' 138 While in these
decisions we see comparativism's uses expanding humanity rights, in other
humanity-rights-related areas, such as abortion and euthanasia, humanity
rights conflict; as such, we can see that comparativist practices are similarly
being justified by the humanity-centered norms themselves. 139
("[T]ransplantation of fact finding arrangements between common law and civil law systems
would give rise to serious strains in the recipient justice system.").
130. 487 U.S. 815.
131. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
132. 536 U.S. 304.
133. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 (plurality opinion).
135. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n.21; see id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(refusing to find other countries' views relevant to the judicial ascertaining of "contemporary
American conceptions of decency").
137. See generally Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (prohibiting the death
penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result,
in death of the victim).
138. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (describing the right at issue "as
an integral part of human freedom in many other countries").
139. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8, 718 n.16 (1997) (citing
Rodriguez v. British Columbia, [1993] D.L.R. 342, 404 (Can.) (discussing assisted suicide
laws in Austria, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland,
and France)); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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When developed by a transnational judiciary, jurists, and civil society,
comparativism offers independent potential for global solidarity. 140 The
concerted turn outward enables alternative justifications to form the basis of
sometimes shared but always principled decision making. 141 Through
pluralizing rationales, comparativism in judicial review offers potential
cosmopolitan effects that may well transcend the consent-based authority of
any one state. This view derives some support from the significant
contemporary increase in the use of comparative analysis in domestic
constitutional courts. This globalizing potential is most evident as it
concerns humanity rights. Moreover, judge-made law is informed not only
by the form of the conflict resolution, but also by actors more broadly
involved in adjudication, and interpretation-e.g., judges, scholars, and
civil society. Since the judicial arena has become the site of conflict
resolution among overlapping and recombinant regimes, this area has
spurred the rise of independent principles of interpretation. Indeed, here we
see the particular link between conflict resolution, international law, and
interpretation-a strand that connects all of the three illustrations in this
section, and reflects the bases for the rise of jurisdiction in the managing of
conflict in global society.
To conclude, this rearticulation of the role of comparativism in areas of
humanity law offers new justification in the prevailing debates about such
methods and the perception of the expansion of judicial power worldwide:
first, because it arises in limited areas involving humanity rights which have
always, going back historically, been areas of shared law reflecting issues
of common humankind; and second, because insofar as these increasingly
involve areas of diminished democratic consent, these demonstrate that this
area of law has long been justified on other rights-based grounds.
CONCLUSION
This essay has traced a number of contemporary debates over the
ongoing meaning of international law and has demonstrated the connections
between these debates. It did so looking at a variety of adjudicative
contexts where the question raised is what counts as the ultimate sources of
140. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,
218-19 (2003) (demonstrating that transnational adjudication can contribute to a "global
community of courts").
141. For example, consider reliance on cosmopolitan law, defined as "those elements of
law-albeit created by states-which create powers and constraints, and rights and duties,
which transcend the claims of nation-states and which have far-reaching national
consequences." David Held et al., Rethinking Globalization, in DAVID HELD & ANTHONY
MCGREW, THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER 70 (2003). The cosmopolitan project
attempts to specify the principles and institutions for making sites and forms of power,
which presently lie beyond the scope of state democratic processes. See generally Jeremy
Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
751 (1992). For a related claim that proposes judicial review modeling democratic self-
determination, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74-77 (1986).
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the authority of international law. Are the sources democratic consent and
theoretical conceptions of justice; or rather international and constitutional
law cases considering the newfound relevance of notionally foreign law in
domestic courts wherever human rights are at stake? These instances
reflect the growing nexus between transformation in jurisdiction and the
underlying substantive values. The relevant trends reflect the usages of
humanity law as a dynamic basis for evolving interpretation across state
lines and as a source of normative values and concerns for a global system
in flux. Therefore, the claim here is that humanity law plays a pivotal role
in laying the bases for law's legality and legitimacy. It is redefining rule of
law both at home and on the global stage.
